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Abstract 
In this paper we review the impact of business history upon business strategy 
research with particular reference to the influence of Alfred Chandler. Noting the 
virtual absence of any historical influences other than Chandler we then ask 
whether his work was in principle unique, whether it was only accidentally 
historical, or whether it does in fact provide a model for further contributions. 
Concluding that the latter is the case we then draw on an analysis of history and 
the social sciences in general, and of the history and social studies of science in 
particular, to illustrate the different ways in which history can contribute to a field 
such as business strategy research. Building on this discussion, and on our own 
research, we then set out a prospectus of specific aspects of business strategy 
research to which an historical approach appears necessary or appropriate. 
Alfred D.Chandler and the framework of 
business strateev research 
In 1962 Alfred D. Chandler’s book Strategy 
and Structure: Chapters in the Historv of 
the Industrial Enterprise was published. 
This was an historical work, based upon 
detailed archive-based historical studies of 
the emergence of decentralised administra- 
tive structures in four large American 
firms (du Pont, General Motors, Jersey 
Standard and Sears) in the early part of 
this century. These in-depth case histories 
were supported by a more general analysis 
of the administrative histories of about a 
hundred other firms. On the basis of his 
historical analysis Chandler argued that 
the decentralised structure in American 
industry arose from the need to administer 
enlarged activities and resources as a 
consequence of corporate growth 
strategies, themselves stimulated by 
changing technologies and demand 
patterns. He also proposed that different 
types of growth would lead to different 
organizational forms and that, as a general 
law, structure follows strategy. Structure 
was here defined as the organizational 
design through which an enterprise was 
administered, whether this was formally or 
informally defined. Strategy was defined as 
the determination of the basic long term 
goals and objectives of an enterprise, 
together with the adoption of courses of 
action and the allocation of resources 
necessary for carrying out those goals. 
The existence of a time lag between 
changes in strategy and structure was 
noted, and attributed to one of two 
reasons: either executives were for some 
time ignorant of their new structural 
needs, or the strategic changes were not 
for a time strong enough to require 
structural changes. 
While researching and writing Strateav a d 
Structure Chandler was a historian in tie 
School of Humanities at MIT, and during 
its most influential period he was 
Professor of History and director of the 
Center for the Study of Recent American 
History at The Johns Hopkins University. 
He was not a business school academic, 
and he did not address his work to the 
business school community. Its impact in 
that community, and especially in the 
Harvard Business School, was however 
tremendous. 
The subject of business strategy was not 
new. Capstone courses in business policy 
had been taught at Harvard since 19 11, 
and were also commonplace at other 
business schools. Peter Drucker had talked 
explicitly of business strategy and 
strategic decision making in his 1955 book, 
The Practice of Management. But there 
was no research field of business strategy, 
and no concept within the business policy 
context of the organization as anything 
other than a static assemblage of 
resources (Ansoff, 1987). Even the fast 
developing literature on organizational 
processes and decision making behaviour 
stimulated by the work of Herbert Simon 
(Simon, 1947, 1957; March and Simon, 1958; 
Cyert and March, 1963) tended to treat 
the organization as a whole as basically 
static. Indeed it was only with the book 
by Burns and Stalker (1961) on T& 
management of innovation, published just 
one year before Chandler’s own work, that 
the kind of dynamic relationship between 
an organization and its environment 
portrayed by Chandler featured significant- 
ly even in the organizational behaviour 
literature. 
So Chandler’s book offered far more than 
just a new argument about business 
strategy or policy. It offered a new 
concept of business strategy as something 
relating the behaviour and structure of an 
organization to its economic environment. 
And it opened up a whole range of 
questions concerning these relationships, 
the existence of which could be used to _ 
define what was in effect a new field of 
enquiry within management science. More 
than any others, two works published in 
1965 marked this development: Ansoffs 
Co vorate St ateny and Andrews, Learned, 
Chiistensen rand &h’s Business Policv; 
Text and Cases, the conceptual content of 
which was due to Andrews and later 
published separately by him as The 
Concept of Corvorate Strategy (1971). 
Ansoff, who had recently joined Cyert at 
the Carnegie Institution, distinguished 
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between three types of business decisions: 
operating decisions, the aim of which was 
to maximize efficiency; administrative 
decisions, concerned with the structure of 
a firm’s resources; and strategic decisions, 
concerned with the firms’s product/market 
mix. For analysis of the first class he 
referred the reader to the recent book by 
Cyert and March (1963), and for that of 
the second class to Chandler’s book, while 
his own book addressed the third class. 
Expanding on the relationship between his 
work and Chandler’s he argued that 
effective strategy problem solving required 
two things: a method of analysis, which he 
sought to supply, and an appropriate 
administrative environment, which he saw 
as being Chandler’s concern. Defined in 
this way, Ansoffs concept of business 
strategy, which has remained influential in 
the field ever since (Hofer & Schendel, 
1978) was very different from Chandler’s. 
It was in effect restricted to strategic 
planning and the formulation of strategies 
in terms of product/market scope, growth 
vectors, competitive advantage and 
synergy. But the influence of Chandler’s 
work on its formulation is undeniable. 
Andrews was Professor of Business Policy 
at Harvard Business School, where he had 
taught since the war, and his new 
textbook was very much in the Harvard 
business policy tradition of the case-based 
teaching of general management or 
business administration. But his definition 
of corporate strategy as “the pattern of 
objectives, purposes or goals and major 
polices and plans for achieving these 
goals, stated in such a way as to define 
what business the company is in or is to 
be in and the kind of company it is, or is 
to be” was close to Chandler’s. And while 
he and his colleagues were still very 
skeptical of the value of Chandler’s work 
(Channon, 1973) his analysis of strategy 
nevertheless appears to have owed much to 
Chandler’s concept of the relationship 
between strategy and structure. 
Chandlerian themes in business strategy 
research 
Apart from its general contribution to the 
molding of the field of business strategy, 
Chandler’s book has also provided a 
starting point for a number of specific 
research trajectories within the field. Its 
most immediate research impact was at the 
Harvard Business School. Harvard had had 
a chair of business history within the 
business school since the interwar years, 
and the journal Business Historv Review 
was edited and published there. It also had 
a strong tradition of case writing and 
teaching, especially in the business policy 
area. For both reasons it was probably 
more open than most business schools to 
the influence of a work such as 
Chandler+. But until Chandler himself 
moved there in 1971, there seems to have 
been little if any connection between the 
School’s work in business history and its 
research in business policy or other areas 
of management science. 
Sometime before then, however, Chandler’s 
work was taken up by a group of doctoral 
researchers in the policy area under the 
supervision of Bruce R.Scott. The starting 
point for this research activity was a 
simple three stage model of corporate 
structural development put forward by 
Scott (1968) in response to a reading of 
Chandler’s work. This was followed by a 
thesis by Leonard Wrigley (1970) in which 
Chandler’s argument in Strateav and 
Structure was formalized and extended in 
terms of a classificatory system of 
strategy and structure dimensions. Using 
these analytical frameworks a group of 
five doctoral students then analyzed the 
historical development of the strategies 
and structures of industrial enterprise in 
five different national settings: Britain 
(Channon, 1973), France and Germany 
(Pooley-Dyas & Thanheiser, 1976), Italy - 
(Pavan, 1972) and the USA (Rumelt, 1974). 
From this work have developed several 
related strands of business strategy 
research. The stages of development model 
was developed by Scott and his students 
(Scott, 1973; McArthur and Scott, 1969; 
Salter 1970) and has since provided a basis 
for a series of more sophisticated analyses 
of corporate structural evolution (Greiner, 
1972; Mintzberg, 1978, 1979). The 
relationship between strategy and structure 
has been explored for other countries and 
other periods than those treated by the 
Harvard group (Suzuki, 1980; Chandler and 
Daems, 1980; Hannah, 1976), and also 
through the development of richer 
conceptual frameworks. Reflecting the 
circumstances specific to Chandler’s study, 
the early work was restricted to a very 
limited characterization of strategic 
options and structural forms, and to an 
even more limited view of the firm’s 
environment. In more recent work these 
restrictions have been gradually removed, 
and more sophisticated analyses of the 
relationships between strategy and 
structure (Miller & Friesen, 1977, 1978; 
Burgelman, 1983; Hall & Saias, 1980; Hill & 
Hoskisson, 1987; Miller, 1986, 1987a; 
Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986; Galbraith & 
Nathanson, 1978; Palmer and others, 1987) 
and between strategy, structure and the 
environment ( Jauch & Kraft, 1986; Jauch 
& Osborn, 198 1; Miller, 1987b; Miller & 
Friesen, 1983) have been developed. In the 
latter context, moreover, Chandler’s 
influence has operated not only directly 
but also through the medium of Thomp- 
son’s (1967) book, Ornanizations in Action, 
which drew heavily on Chandler but 
focussed on the relationship between 
organization and environment. In the 
hands of Miller and Friesen at McGill 
University, the longitudinal analysis of 
strategy, structure and environmental 
variables over a range of firms has led 
from a Chandlerian starting point to a 
general theory of strategic change 
processes (Miller & Friesen, 1980, 1984; 
Miller, 1982). 
Another stream of research has concerned 
the performance implications of the 
strategy-structure relationship, and has 
built on the doctoral work of Rumelt 
(1974). These implications were from the 
beginning an interest of the Harvard team 
under Scott, but only for the American 
context were sufficient data available for 
the line to be pursued. In fact, although 
Rumelt was able to come to some prelimi- 
nary conclusions, further development of 
this type of analysis has proved difficult 
and most of the prescriptive content of 
the strategy and structure literature 
remains only qualitatively grounded. The 
performance implications remain high on 
the overall research agenda of the business 
strategy field, however; Rumelt’s work is 
established as a classic, and some further 
progress has been made (Nathanson & 
Cassaro, 1982; Christensen & Montgomery, 
1982; Teece, 1981). 
Before the work we have described got 
under way, Chandler’s work also impacted 
on another body of doctoral research at 
Harvard, this time in the international 
business area. The Multinational Enterprise 
Project was managed by Curhan and 
Vaupel and strongly influenced by Vernon 
and Fouraker (Vaupel & Curhan, 1969). It 
did not owe its conception to Chandler’s 
work, but the birth of the multinational 
enterprise fitted naturally into a 
Chandlerian strategy and structure 
framework. In particular it was closely 
related to the rise of the multi-divisional 
form of structure. From this project came 
a series of important works (Stopford & 
Wells, 1972; Frank0 1976; Stopford, 1968; 
Fouraker and Stopford, 1968; Franko, 1974) 
which served not only to develop the 
analysis of strategy-structure relationships 
but also to establish multinationals as a 
major new field of business strategy 
research. Moreover, although more recent 
work on multinationals has gone beyond 
the strategy-structure framework, the 
research field has still not lost sight of its 
Chandlerian origins. 
The third major influence of Chandler’s 
work on business strategy research has 
been altogether different, and has come 
about through the work of Oliver 
Williamson. Williamson’s interest was in 
the theory of the firm, and in particular 
in the problems posed by Coase’s work in 
this field. He completed his doctoral 
research with Simon, March and Cyert at 
Carnegie and before encountering the work 
of Chandler he had already sought to 
explain the structure of the firm by 
combining Simon’s insights with an 
economic analysis in terms of utility 
maximization (Williamson, 1986). 
On reading Strateav and Structure in the 
late 196Os, Williamson was struck by the 
role played by administrative factors 
internal to the firm, which appeared 
inconsistent with the existing economic 
models. But he also saw the possibility of 
combining Chandler’s organizational 
analysis with Coase’s economic analysis of 
the transaction costs of alternative forms 
of contractual relations. According to the 
view developed in his book Markets and 
Hierarchies (1975), developments of 
corporate structure, and especially those in 
which a reliance of market contracts was 
replaced through a process of vertical 
integration by the use of internal 
contracts, could be seen as a consequence 
of transaction-cost minimizing managerial 
behaviour. 
This view was strongly reinforced by the 
appearance in 1977 of Chandler’s new 
book, The Visible Hand: The Management 
Revolution in American Business. On the 
basis of an historical study of the rise of 
the modern business enterprise in the 
period 1840-1920 (i.e. the period preceding 
that of Stratenv and Structure), Chandler 
argued that multi-unit enterprises replaced 
traditional single activity firms when the 
volume of economic activity reached a 
point at which lower costs and so higher 
profits could be attained through 
administrative coordination than through 
market coordination. This argument lent 
itself admirably to Williamson’s transaction 
cost interpretation, and was soon embraced 
by it (Williamson, 1980). Meanwhile William 
Ouchi applied the transaction cost 
approach to the analysis of alternative 
forms of structure or alternative 
managerial control systems. Three types of 
company organization (labelled markets, 
bureaucracies and clans) were defined and 
the choice between them explained in 
terms of the costs of mediating exchanges 
between individuals in different cir- 
cumstances and environments (Ouchi, 1980; 
Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983). 
Derived though it is from a consideration 
of Chandler’s analysis, there is little room 
in Williamson’s approach for strategy. But 
transaction cost analysis has been 
developed within the business strategy 
context both conceptually (Kay, 1982) and 
prescriptively (Teece, 1985), and it 
continues to be a significant force in the 
field. 
Finally in this section mention should be 
made of the Harvard organization and 
environment research programme, and in 
particular of Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) 
book, Oraanization and Environment: 
Managing Differentiation and Intearation. 
The contingency theory approach pioneered 
in this work has had a tremendous impact 
on business strategy as on other aspects 
of management research, and while its 
genesis appears to have owed more to 
Burns and Stalker and other organizational 
theorists than to Chandler (Lawrence, 
1981) the general influence of Chandler’s 
work is nevertheless apparent. 
Historv and stratew bevond Chandler 
On the basis of the influences discussed in 
the last section we may already say that 
business history has had a major and 
profound influence upon business strategy 
research. But so far we have been 
concerned only with the influence of one 
man and, to a very large extent, one book. 
This might be taken to suggest that the 
influence of business history as a whole 
could, in principle at least, be quite 
enormous. But it could also be that 
Chandler’s contribution was in some way 
in principle unique, or that its historical 
dressing was essentially accidental. 
Certainly it is true that as a professional 
historian writing within the mainstream of 
management science Chandler is virtually 
unique. There are other examples. When 
Paul Lawrence came to look at the 
problems facing American industry in the 
late 1970s he felt the need of a profes- 
sional historian as co-researcher and 
enlisted David Dyer to work with him on 
what became their joint book, Renewing 
American Industrv (Lawrence & Dyer, 
1983). But this book has not had a major 
impact on the business strategy field. Nor 
has Margaret Graham’s (1986) history, RCA 
and the Videodisc, though it is a 
fascinating case study. And I can think of 
no other examples, either in business 
strategy or indeed in management science 
as a whole. 
Some researchers have of course adopted 
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historical or partially historical methodo- 
logies, without necessarily calling them 
that, and this category includes some 
significant contributions. Andrew 
Pettigrew has argued consistently for an 
historically based approach, and adopted 
such an approach in his (1985) book, The 
Awakening Giant. Continuitv and Change 
in ICI. Gerry Johnson’s recent (1987) 
book on Strategic Chance and the 
Management Process also has an historical 
element. But neither of these works can 
really be called business history. They 
incorporate an awareness of historical 
context, but no more so than any case 
study should. And their main focus is 
upon processes observed in real time and 
from close range, not upon analysis of the 
historical record. 
So is Chandler’s contribution unique? Is 
its historical dimension accidental? Or is 
it reasonable to look for other ways in 
which business history might contribute 
significantly to the strategy field? 
As a business historian Chandler is, if not 
unique, at least very rare, for he is 
essentially a historian of business rather 
than of businesses, of the firm rather than 
of firms. And if we look at the history of 
the firm, then its structural evolution over 
the last 150 years does stand out as one 
of the most prominent features of the 
historical landscape. But it is certainly not 
the only feature, nor is there is any 
reason to believe it is the only feature 
which can be related to issues to business 
strategy. The culture of business has 
certainly changed, and so has the nature 
of the managerial contract. So too has the 
pattern of relationships between the firm 
and its different stakeholders: owners, 
employees, government and society. 
Where structural changes may be rather 
more unique is in their dual appearance in 
both the development of the individual 
firm, regardless of historical context, and 
the development of the characteristic firm 
on the activities of which the economy is 
based. In Strategy and Structure Chandler 
described a change that could be observed 
in leading American firms in the 192Os, 
but it was also a change that could be 
observed in the development of any firm 
at a certain stage of its development, 
whether that stage was reached in the 
1920s or the 1960s. And this clearly 
contributed greatly to the perceived 
relevance of the historical work to current 
business issues. On the other hand, the 
development of Chandler’s work in a 
business strategy context rested upon an 
extrapolation of the relationship between 
strategy and structure he observed to 
stages of strategic and structural 
development that no firm had yet reached 
in the period covered by the history. 
There seems no reason why historical 
observations of other features or 
relationships should not similarly be 
extrapolated to contemporary features or 
relationships of the same kind. 
This still leaves the question open, 
however, as to how far the historical 
dimension was actually essential to 
Chandler’s contribution. Since the 
processes he observed do take place within 
a contemporary setting, could they not 
equally well have been analyzed in that 
setting in the first place, using more 
orthodox management science tools. Was it 
not perhaps just fortuitous that an idea 
for which the business research community 
was ready happened to find its first 
expression in a historical context? 
To some extent this is probably so. But 
given the close parallels between historical 
and contemporary changes there were 
considerable advantages associated with 
the historical approach. The central 
phenomenon of structural change stood out 
much more clearly in the historical 
setting, and could be much more clearly 
related to general, underlying environmen- 
tal changes. The pattern of internal 
causation by which strategic decisions led 
to structural ones could be extracted from 
the historical record much more easily and 
securely than it could have been from 
contemporary observations, clouded as 
these are by a host of factors resulting 
from the relationship between the observer 
and his sources. Even if Chandler’s point 
could have been made by a contemporary 
analyst, it is most unlikely that it could 
have been made with such clarity and to 
such effect. 
So if Chandler’s thesis is not unique, and 
its historical source is not accidental, 
might we not look to history for further 
insights to the field of business strategy? 
We might indeed, and we shall offer in the 
last section of this paper a prospectus for 
the future contributions of business history 
to business strategy. But first it is 
important to be clear just what historical 
research can and cannot achieve in 
relation to the social sciences in general, 
and management sciences in particular. 
Historv and the social sciences: nroblems 
and Dossibilities 
Despite the positive conclusion of the 
preceding section, the fact remains that 
there has in practice been a sharp 
contrast between the influence of Chandler 
on the management sciences and the 
influence of other business historians. 
Although business history is in some 
respects a formally recognized component 
of the field of management sciences (as a 
division, for example, within the Academy 
of Management), it has been very 
generally dismissed, both by scholars in 
the field and by their institutions (Hannah, 
1981). Chandler’s work excepted, the 
impact of the business history corpus on 
the mainstream of management science has 
been negligible. History, for most business 
academics, appears to be of anecdotal 
interest only, with little to contribute to a 
“scientific” understanding of business. 
This contempt for history is by no means 
restricted to business academics, for in 
organizational theory in general the same 
attitude prevails. Economics, sociology, and 
social psychology, even anthropology and 
individual psychology, are academically 
respectable and recognised as contributing 
essentially to the field, but history is not. 
Even when, as is often the case, the 
subject matter of an investigation is 
historical, the sophisticated methods and 
standards of historical research are 
commonly eschewed. As Merton (1968) has 
pointed out, contemporary sociological 
theory and methodology is characterized 
by a quite extraordinary historical naivety. 
And yet without history large parts of the 
social sciences would scarcely exist. For 
Marx and Weber, historical analysis was 
the central component of sociological 
research. For Freud and Jung it was the 
primary medium through which their ideas 
were developed. For Levi-Strauss, history 
is complementary to anthropology and 
essential to structural analysis: “By 
showing institutions in the process of 
transformation, history alone makes it 
possible to abstract the structure which 
underlies the many manifestations and 
remains permanent throughout a succession 
of events” (Levi-Strauss, 1963). Reflecting 
this prescription, the work of Foucault is 
as much a part of history as it is of 
sociology. 
In order to understand better what hinders 
the interaction between history and the 
social sciences on one hand, and in what 
ways this interaction can be profitably 
developed on the other, it is worth taking 
a brief look at the particular area of 
science studies. This is the one area in 
which history and the social sciences have 
interacted to a considerable extent in 
recent years, despite continuing barriers 
and other problems. The history, 
philosophy and sociology of science are 
commonly taught in the same university 
departments, and increasingly share the 
same scholarly journals. They also have 
their own journals, and there is still a 
clear demarcation between the different 
professional groups, each of which tends 
to be wary, and sometimes dismissive, of 
the others. But at the leading edge of 
research the three approaches interact 
strongly, and among the leading prac- 
titioners at least there is a clear 
recognition of each others’ values and 
contributions. 
The striking feature of this interaction 
from our present point of view is that it 
is history which is in many ways the 
driving force. The archetypal historical 
contribution, Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific 
RevolutionS (1962), is in many ways a 
history of science equivalent of Strateny 
and Structure. But in contrast with the 
situation in business studies, Kuhn’s work 
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has been followed by a succession of other 
histories or historically based analyses of 
philosophical and sociological import (for 
example Holton, 1973; Forman, 197 1; 
Hacking, 1983; Rudwick, 1985; Schaffer and 
Shapin, 1985; Galison, 1987; Latour, 1988). 
The more influential of these contributions 
have several features in common. Unlike 
the brief historical case studies tradition- 
ally used by philosophers and sociologists 
of science they make use of all the 
available historical evidence and are 
written to the standards of professional 
history. But they are also directed 
explicitly towards specific philosophical 
and sociological issues. And they are used 
by their authors to support explicit theses 
in these fields. These theses are not 
necessarily as dramatic as those of Kuhn 
or Chandler. The work may contribute to 
established theories and debates rather 
than proposing new ones. Typically, it may 
address the scope and limitations of 
different forms of “scientific” explanation 
or the nature and extent of different 
types of influence. 
In most of these works, the difference 
between the historical and the contem- 
porary context, often adduced by social 
scientists and practitioners as a key 
obstacle to the effective application of 
history, is also put to positive use. Either 
the same theme is explored in’ different 
historical contexts, so that common 
properties independent of the context can 
be extracted. Or the use of a context 
different to the contemporary one is used 
to bring out aspects of a situation whose 
relationship with the context is such as to 
prevent their clear apprehension ,from 
within that context. A good history takes 
the reader into a conceptual framework 
characteristic of the subject, period and 
context being studied, but it does so by 
making this framework explicit, whereas 
the framework of contemporary action 
remains almost always implicit. 
Finally, while some of the influential 
historical works draw their conclusions 
from relatively large samples of cases, 
many rely on the in-depth study of 
individual or small numbers of processes, 
and in particular on analysis conducted at 
the level of individual action. They are 
concerned with the purposes and motives 
of actors, and not merely with their 
visible actions. This concern raises an 
important point, for although a significant 
body of social research has been based 
upon the primacy of purposive and 
motivated action (Parsons & Shils, 1951), 
such a perspective has long been out of 
fashion. Contemporary social and 
psychological theory either eschews any 
explanation of observed regularities, or 
restricts such explanation to the operation 
of sociological or cognitive forces 
operating beyond the realm of conscious 
purpose. This bias operates in the study 
of science as well as in that of organiza- 
tions, but the contributions of the history 
of science have served to emphasize that 
the conscious actions of the individual 
cannot be ignored. Even if an explanation 
makes no reference to such actions, it still 
has to conform with them, and among the 
functions performed by the historian is the 
demonstration or otherwise of this 
conformity, and the establishment of a 
relationship between the constructed world 
of social theory and the perceived world 
of social action. In some cases, perhaps, 
this function could be performed by a 
contemporary researcher, but it is not 
often that people will be prepared to 
reveal their motives or intentions directly 
to an observer. Such things are typically 
captured much more easily and much more 
surely by an historian working with the 
benefit of intimate records, but without 
the complications of personal involvement. 
These general properties of the more 
influential histories of science are shared 
by Chandler’s work, and to a large extent 
too by the only other historical work to 
have made a significant impact on recent 
organization theory, Janis’s (1972) Victims 
gf Grouvthink. And they illustrate both 
the limitations of history and its positive 
value in a social science context. In the 
context of management and organizations 
there is no “philosophy” of the subject, 
but mathematical analysis in the tradition 
of Simon and applications of cognitive 
psychology both correspond to aspects of 
the “philosophy of science”, and the 
illustrations drawn from science studies 
may be easily carried across. 
In contrast with historians of science, it 
striking that business historians 
iSChandler excepted) have not specifically 
and explicitly addressed issues in 
management science. Consequently, their 
work has had no immediate relevance for 
the management science community, who 
have accordingly had no reason to take it 
seriously. And where management scientists 
have themselves adopted a partially 
historical perspective, they have not in 
general adopted the standards of profes- 
sional history. Since the value of any 
piece of work is likely to be correlated to 
the skill with which it was conducted, the 
results have been meagre, and the 
prejudice against history reinforced. But 
there is nothing in this situation that 
cannot be changed. Since the business 
strategy field is heavily hooked on the 
problem of relevance, there may be a 
greater resistance to the purposive use of 
historical contexts than in the field of 
science studies, which has traditionally 
drawn on historical example. On the other 
hand, however, the demand for relevance 
should also make more amenable the 
argument that theory should be grounded 
in, or at least related to, the observation 
of purposive behaviour. 
In the reception of Chandler’s work, the 
dimension of managers’ motivations and 
purposive actions was an early casualty. 
Indeed the whole question of the processes 
through which change was implemented in 
terms of managerial assessments and 
decisions, central to Chandler’s own 
analysis, was largely ignored. But this 
seems to have been more i a reflection of 
the primitive state of the subject’s 
development than one of methodological 
dogmas. Both business strategy in 
particular and management science in 
general retain a strong tendency to shy 
away from any concern with the individual 
actor and his motives. But there is an 
increasing awareness of the dangers of 
this posture, especially in a subject 
dominated by practical concerns, and by 
the need to inform managers as to how 
they should, consciously, behave (Mulligan, 
1987). In theoretical terms, business 
strategy and organizational theory appear 
to be at something of a crisis point, with 
a host of theoretical frameworks connected 
by a variety of metatheoretical syntheses, 
but with only minimal connections to the 
world of the individual problem-facing 
manager. Here, surely, is a potential role 
for history. 
Business historv in business strateev: 4 
future role 
Drawing on the preceding discussion, and 
on the insights gained from some of our 
own historical work in progress, we may 
now put forward a prospectus detailing 
some specific ways in which, and specific 
topics upon which, we feel business history 
can contribute to research in the business 
strategy field. 
The most natural application of history is 
to the study of change processes taking 
place over relatively long time scales. 
Whereas most other forms of enquiry rely 
on the analysis of data collected at 
specific time points or upon observations 
carried out over relatively short periods, 
historical analysis has no such limitations. 
The value of historical analysis is not 
however limited to the study of long-term 
change processes, as many of the examples 
discussed above confirm. 
In what follows, we have identified five 
areas of study in which an historical 
approach can link into general business 
strategy areas. In some cases our own 
research has suggested specific hypotheses. 
In others it is simply the approach that is 
significant. 
Charming Industrv Structure. The study of 
industry structure is usually considered to 
be the preserve of economists. But it is 
fair to say that much economic (par- 
ticularly neo-classical) theory is more 
concerned with the aggregates of 
productivity, profits and so forth, or 
treats firms as “black boxes”, responding 
in rational ways to outside stimuli. 
Furthermore, economists have generally 
shied away from examining oligopoly, 
concentrating instead on either of the two 
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extremes: perfect competition or monopoly. 
The historical approach to the firm treats 
it as a living, organic entity, possessing 
unique characteristics which distinguishes 
one firm from another. Chandler’s 
principal contribution to the theory of the 
firm has been to compare oligopolies in 
different industries. His lead has been 
largely ignored. Derek Channon’s 
application of the strategy/structure 
paradigm for the UK eschewed depth, 
concentrating on breadth instead. While 
much of the outline of the shift from 
unitary to decentralised corporations is 
clear, the detailed motivations and decision 
making involved is hidden. 
Historical analysis of how industry 
structure changes over time can 
supplement work of this sort by comparing 
how firms across industries or within 
industries respond to similar external 
influences. Historical work tracing how 
firms in the same industry respond to 
changing market conditions, market entry 
and its effect on firm strategy is starting 
to get into print. Stephen Tolliday’s 
(1988) volume on firm strategy in the steel 
industry provides many useful insights into 
strategic choices in mature industries: 
some sought protection by government 
subsidy; others adopted classic endgame 
strategies (Harrigan 1986). Such analysis 
could be complementary to econometric 
work on industry structure, testing 
whether the economists’ assumptions hold 
good in the real world. 
Technological Innovation. Among the long 
term change processes of interest in the 
business strategy field, one that has been 
relatively little explored is that of 
changing markets and industry structures, 
in particular in response to changes in 
technology. In the course of the last 
century revolutionary developments in 
chemicals, electrical technology, motive 
power technology, plastics, synthetic 
fibres, electronics and data processing 
technologies have each ied to radical 
changes in industry structure. More recent 
developments in biotechnology and 
materials are beginning to have similar 
effects. These changes take place not only 
in those sectors directly concerned with 
the production of the new technology, but 
in all those sectors to which the 
technology is applied. The effect of the 
computing revolution, for example, has 
been felt in sectors as diverse as machine 
tools and textiles, automobiles and 
banking, as well as in electronics and 
office machinery. And with each 
transformation, some firms profit while 
others lose out. From the strategy 
viewpoint, the most interesting thing here 
is the relationship between firms’ 
behaviour, in respect of the new 
technology and the changing market 
opportunities around it, and firms’ 
performance with respect to the changing 
industrial structure. It is hard to see how 
this relationship could be studied other 
than historically, and we are currently in 
the process of launching a historical 
research programme on this topic. 
Although it will be fundamentally 
historical, this research programme will 
not be typical of the historical approaches 
discussed above. It will be relatively large 
sample work, fitted into a quantitative 
evaluative framework. The individual actor 
and his motives will not be of primary 
interest. There is more scope for history 
to apply its characteristic strengths, 
however, in the other long term change 
process of interest in the strategy field, 
the process of strategic change in 
individual firms. 
Strategic Change Processes. Much of the 
interest in strategic change processes in 
the firm derives directly or indirectly from 
the work of Chandler, and research in the 
field is marked both by longitudinal 
research methods and by a general 
awareness of historical context. Much of 
this work has however fallen short of 
historical standards of evidence and 
interpretation. Williamson’s transaction 
cost interpretation of structural change 
has been justifiably criticised (Perrow, 
1981; Robins, 1987) for ignoring those 
substantial parts of the historical record 
that appear to be in conflict with it. 
Miller and Friesen’s analysis of strategic 
changes in firms over a 40 year time 
period provided prima facie evidence for a 
discontinuous revolutionary model of the 
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change process (Miller & Friesen, 1980, 
1984). But neither Miller’s interpretation 
of this process nor the totally contrasting 
interpretation offered by his McGill 
colleagues Mintzberg and McHugh can be 
fully supported by the historical evidence 
presented (Miller, 1982; Mintzberg and 
McHugh, 1985). 
Historical analysis has found rather more 
favour in the special field of international 
business. The flow of capital across 
national boundaries was one of the first 
themes to be taken up by business 
historians in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Much of the work 
done by Chandler related directly to 
concepts of international business 
management and built upon earlier studies 
of American direct foreign investment 
undertaken by Vernon (1959). And since 
the publication of Strategy and Structure 
many of the foremost practitioners in 
international business strategy, including 
John Stopford, Lawrence Franko, Mark 
Casson, and John Dunning, have used 
historical examples to develop their 
theories. John Dunning’s influential 
“eclectic paradigm” theory is itself 
multidisciplinary, with history playing a 
core role. Work by Mira Wilkins (1986; 
1988) and Howard Archer (1986) has 
contributed to the debate which Dunning’s 
paradigm has aroused, pointing to the 
important entrepreneurial characteristics of 
many overseas investment decisions. 
Wilkins’ theory of the “free-standing 
company” shows the way: in which our 
understanding of the international business 
enterprise is enriched by counter intuitive 
examples which have come about largely as 
a result of detailed historical analysis. 
None of this work has interacted directly, 
however, with the more general analyses 
of strategic decision making and strategic 
change processes conducted by Mintzberg 
and his collaborators, Quinn (1980) or 
Johnson (1987). And while, as a result of 
the work of these and other researchers, 
we are beginning to get some understand- 
ing of the patterns of strategic change, 
and of how these patterns relate to 
managerial behaviour, the picture is still 
very hazy. Different studies employ 
different conceptual models and suggest 
different patterns of motivation, intent, 
and action, and different modes of 
rational, social or psychological causation. 
If we are to develop our understanding of 
the processes involved further it seems 
likely that a substantial body of research 
will be needed, and that some of this will 
be historical. Meanwhile, our own research, 
focussing on strategic change in 
technology-based firms and in particular 
on the .new product development process, 
has already led to some interesting 
perspectives and hypotheses. The natural 
historical focus upon the conscious role of 
the actor has allowed us to combine to 
some extent the cognitive, cultural and 
rational frameworks adopted by different 
researchers within an overall framework of 
political action characterized by 
negotiation processes between interest 
groups. Using substantial and carefully 
researched case histories this approach has 
led to the development of a classification 
of the elements of political context and 
political activity present in strategic 
processes, and to some preliminary results 
on the relationship between perceived 
decision making and implementation 
activities in such processes (Hendry, 1988). 
Industrv and the State, Turning from the 
general dimensions of business strategy to 
some more specific research areas, the 
application of an historical approach seems 
particularyl appropriate when there is some 
element of secrecy or subterfuge 
conditioning the actors* responses to real 
time investigation. A particular example of 
this, and one that has featured strongly in 
our own work, concerns the relationship 
between government and industry, and in 
particular the strategic response of the 
firm to specific government policy 
measures (for example in innovation 
policy). Direct observation of contemporary 
responses is virtually impossible, for 
econometric analysis is generally ruled out 
by the specificity of government 
instruments and their implementation, and 
qualitative observation is highly likely to 
be misleading. There is in general a 
considerable difference between the 
rhetoric of a firm’s response, designed to 
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please or appease government, to secure 
funding, and perhaps to deprive com- 
petitors of that funding, and the actuality 
of the response. The rhetoric is im- 
mediately apparent, but the reality is 
harder to determine and can probably only 
be uncovered historically when the issue 
which dictated the rhetoric cease to be 
important. 
A full understanding of firms’ responses to 
government intervention is still a task for 
the future, but a process of historical 
analysis has already led to some 
preliminary conclusions in support or 
elaboration of the non-historical arguments 
of Mintzberg (1984) and Porter (1988). 
Strateav and Stakeholders. As a final 
example of a subject to which history 
might usefully be applied but has not yet 
been so, we might take the relationship 
between entrepreneurial and managerial 
motives and strategic goals. Within formal 
models of strategic planning and decision- 
making it is a commonplace that strategic 
goals are set within the framework of a 
corporate mission, embracing not only the 
desired positioning of the firm in the 
marketplace but also its role in society 
and its perceived responsibilities to 
shareholders, customers, employees, and 
local and national communities. However, 
the relationships of this framework, and 
especially of its social, political or ethical 
components to competitive strategy making 
remains obscure. Once again, the rhetoric 
masks the reality. Within the business 
history context, however, these are 
precisely the kinds of relationships which 
have traditionally attracted the historians 
attention, and which have lent themselves 
to analysis through historical documenta- 
tion. 
Conclusion 
We feel that this research agenda validates 
our argument that business history has a 
great deal to contribute to the study of 
business strategy. The problems and 
suspicions have arisen largely because of 
the unwillingness of historians to tackle 
these issues. The evidence is that over 
the last decade this state of affairs is 
changing and that business historians are 
beginning to absorb more theory and use 
it effectively as a means to guide their 
research. Chandler was largely responsible 
for this change, circumventing the sterile 
contemporary debate about the ethics of 
American businessmen. concentrating 
instead on the dynamics and strategic 
changes of big American corporations. 
Much of the work undertaken by other 
strategy researchers would be at best 
distorted, or at worst meaningless, without 
a strong historical framework; the task 
remains for us as historians to develop 
challenging hypotheses and to focus our 
work on issues directly relevant to 
business strategy concerns. If others do 
not give us a proper hearing, then we will 
have no-one to blame but ourselves. 
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